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Moral Education and the Construction of
Meaning
WILLEM WARDEKKER, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, and Hogeschool
Windesheim, Zwolle, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT In this article, I develop the idea that the starting point of moral
education is formed by the affective commitments individuals make in the course of
growing up. The task of education is to enable children to critically consider and
revise these commitments, as part of the development of a reflective personal
identity. Ethical concepts like justice as well as other culturally developed ‘instru-
ments’ may be taught in order to structure the discursive development of identity.
This points to a view of moral education that differs from the two approaches that
are now most popular.
Introduction
Moral and citizenship education are high on the agenda of politicians and educators
alike. Not all reasons given for this prominence may be equally sound (is it really true
that youth criminality has risen so much?) and it may also be that moral education
will not solve the real problem (is disinterest in democracy related to failing education
or to a crisis in democracy itself?), but the fact remains that moral development and
education is an important topic for the field of education, and certainly also for
educational studies. It is, moreover, a topic that has been discussed since ancient times
and on which a wealth of material is available. It is all the more surprising, then, that
there are virtually no studies of this topic that are explicitly based in a sociocultural
or neo-Vygotskian point of view, which stresses the importance of the cultural context
of development and actions. Until now, I have been able to unearth only some
contributions by Mark Tappan (Tappan, 1991, 1998; Day & Tappan, 1996; Tappan &
Brown, 1998) and another one by Paul Crawford (Crawford, 2001) that explicitly
refer to the Vygotskian tradition. Of course, work has been done in a wider
philosophical field that is germane to a sociocultural view (e.g. Benhabib, 1992) and
I will be making some use of it. However, most of that work is concerned with the
legitimation of moral values rather than directly with education.
I cannot hope, of course, to formulate here a fully developed sociocultural view
of moral development and education. I will confine myself to mentioning a few
principles that I consider relevant for thinking about these topics along sociocultural
lines. The contributions by Tappan and Crawford provide a good starting point,
Tappan showing how narratives mediate moral experience and are internalized in the
zone of proximal development, and Crawford extending this view by pointing out
analogies between the several forms of conceptual thinking Vygotsky discerned on






































































the one hand, and forms of moral action and decision-making on the other hand.
However, I think it is necessary first to give some attention to the nature of what is
called moral behaviour.
Both Tappan and Crawford at least give the impression (and Tappan seems to state
so directly) that moral action is a specific class or domain of activities, which could
then be distinguished from e.g. instrumental action. It is an activity, in their view,
that is explicitly concerned with moral issues—e.g. discussing the morality of war,
or of a decision taken earlier. As a consequence, according to them acting morally
can be learned separately from other forms of activity, by taking part in such
discussions. They share this position with the majority of scholars from other
traditions in thinking about moral education. Much of this thinking relies on first
identifying a desired end point for moral development, e.g. a post-conventional
stance or critical-democratic citizenship, and then looking for educational procedures
to reach this end. In this contribution, I will use a slightly different approach to
morality and moral education, one that relies on a more developmental view
and emphasizes the importance of affect and commitment rather than (moral)
cognitions.
Identity and valuation
A central feature of sociocultural theory (that it shares with other approaches) is that
human beings are meaning-givers. Each individual attaches personal meaning to
objects, persons, situations, and practices, and to themselves in relation to all these.
They do so whenever they encounter them in the course of their activities. These
meanings are not neutral; they arise out of, and are imbued with, emotions related to
the role they play in an activity the individual is engaged in, and thus they represent
the individual’s valuations rather than objective ‘knowledge’ (Bonnett & Cuypers,
2003). Meanings represent not only how we think the world is, but also, and maybe
primarily, how we do, or do not, care about such objects etc. They are the products
of our experiences with the world. Note that such meanings are not always verbal
concepts; in many cases they belong (at least initially) to the domain of ‘tacit
knowledge’ that is largely non-verbal. It may be even better to say that meanings are
not solely ‘in the mind’ at all; for the individual, they become ‘located’ in the objects
etc. themselves, so that any encounter with them triggers the attached meanings and
valuations. In that sense, the outside world guides (but does not determine) the
individual’s actions not only in its purely physical aspects.
As these meanings represent a relation between the subject and the world, ‘giving
meaning’ implies at the same time building a personal identity, which actually is a
personal way of relating to the world. Identity, too, is initially non-verbal and largely
implicit. Thus, learning about the world by experience is not something different
from building a personal identity: these are two sides of the same process.
The earlier description is slightly misleading in that it gives the impression that
meaning-making is a strictly individual, and maybe even idiosyncratic, process. This,
however, is not the case. Other people with whom the individual interacts point out
the objects etc. to which meaning is to be attached, they show their own valuations
and their valuation of the individual’s valuations, they value the individual’s
developing identity in a certain way. And in doing so, they in turn do not express just
idiosyncratic valuations, but partly at least those a community of practice has




































































185Moral Education and the Construction of Meaning
(Such practices are not only those of work or school; any human goal-directed
activity takes the form of a cultural practice, that is, has a historical and cultural
form.) ‘In our self-definition and self-evaluation we have to take as a background a
sense of what is significant independently of our autonomous will’ say Bonnett and
Cuypers (2003, p. 334), paraphrasing Charles Taylor (1992). Learning about the
world and building an identity are fundamentally social processes. This however
should not be taken as a strict socialization process: the meanings an individual
makes depend also on prior experience, connect with earlier valuations, and are also
related to pre-existing (but not necessarily unchangeable) personality characteristics.
‘The existential identity of a person and his or her self-esteem are not built in a
monological, but in a dialogical way’ (Bonnett & Cuypers 2003, p. 334); meanings
and identity are co-constructions. Growing up and education are neither a matter of
(creating opportunities for) autonomous self-realization nor of passive socialization;
they are best seen as a process of individuation in which the individual identity
gradually takes shape. Note that ‘education’ does not especially refer to schools here;
on the contrary, the existing school system in Western countries inhibits rather than
enables the individuation process, by all but excluding personal out-of-school
experiences from curricular processes.
Certainly in the early years of an individual’s life, but later too, many valuations
originate ‘behind our backs’, non-consciously and without intent, as a result of
emotions being coupled with (social) experiences, and/or of taking over the social
valuations already inherent in language use (for language, in a sense, constitutes
experience instead of the other way round) (Day & Tappan, 1996). Thus, they may
guide the individual’s actions in an unreflected way. It is the growing command of
language that makes reflection possible and with it, the capability of directing one’s
own behaviour and changing the original valuations. We build ‘identity stories’
about our behaviour and our relation to the world and to ourselves, and use these to
monitor and guide our own behaviour in a heuristic way (Holland et al., 1998). In
these stories, we strive for a certain (context-related) consistency. This can only be
effective if the language signs we use are appropriated, that is, we make selective use
of available language resources and ‘personalize’ them with a valuative content. This
process of reflecting on our valuation and trying to find ‘labels’ for them that have
a social origin but are connected with personal valuative emotions will especially
take place when the subject is confronted with a situation in which ‘old’ and hitherto
unreflected valuations get in the way of desired participation in social practices
(Wardekker & Meijers, submitted for publication). In modern society, where stable
social structures have dissolved and people need to participate in ever changing
practices, such revisions are necessary and subjects need to be able to use specific
‘identity strategies’ in order to maintain a reflective and effective narrative identity
(Giddens, 1991).
Valuation and morality
In all of the earlier discussions, I have not yet broached the subject of morality.
But it is already implicated in the whole pattern. Some remarks follow to make this
clear.
First of all, moral behaviour is not primarily a separate type or class of behaviour.
Nor is it primarily a practice or an activity (in the Leontiev sense) by itself. Rather,





































































to do with taking responsibility for your actions and for your participation in
practices, especially as they affect other people. However, the moral quality of
actions can be reflected upon, either by ourselves or together with others. In this
process, the valuations that guide our actions, and the narratives that structure these
valuations, come under scrutiny and may be changed. This reflection process may be
termed ‘moral activity’. This is, I gather, what Tappan (1998) refers to when
speaking of morality as an activity. He points out that very often this reflection
process does not make use of the type of concepts that are generally considered to
refer to morality, like respect, justice, or honesty; it takes place in what he calls
‘vernacular language’. That is, speaking and reflecting about moral issues is speaking
about the things one considers important, that one feels committed to. The type of
concepts just referred to constitute what may be called ‘scientific concepts’ in the
Vygotskian sense: language tools developed in the course of history to guide and
assist our thinking about moral matters. Acquiring such concepts makes a more
structured type of reflection and discussion possible, partly because of their referral
to principles of moral discourse and action that are considered valid. They do not,
however, constitute morality. They will only have a real effect on a person’s actions
if their use in reflection leads to changes in that person’s identity narratives, which
implies that changes in valuations, in the affects attached to the world and to oneself,
have to be effected.
This is one way of saying that morality and responsibility need an affective basis:
one is only prepared and able to take responsibility about situations, things, persons
and activities that matter. There is no morality without empathy. This may well be
the greater problem in our present society and accordingly for education. The
inability or unwillingness to live morally (or even to keep to social rules), which is
noted and deplored by many politicians and educators, may stem not from a failure
to provide young people with (knowledge of) proper values, but from their inability
to identify with and feel empathy for existing societal arrangements and/or people
living within them. And this is not easily remedied. In many cases, a feeling that our
actions (e.g. voting) have no real impact because the power of decision does not lie
with the institutions for which we can vote, or that these institutions themselves may
be immoral or at least act in an immoral way, is based on reality. Moreover, as
Conroy (2003) suggests, even in situations where our actions can have a real impact,
it is often unclear where our responsibility lies. Most social situations, and most
people with whom we interact, are so complex that a clear course of action is
impossible. Morality is possible only on the basis of insight in the fundamental
complexity and ambiguity of human existence.
Morality and responsibility suppose the possibility of choice. Young children are
unable to act morally by themselves; when they participate in social practices,
the moral aspect of their actions (together with many of the more technical aspects)
will be taken care of by more adult participants. It is exactly in this way, where
novices are treated ‘as if’ they could fully participate in social practices, that they
learn to become more central participants (Lave & Wenger, 1991); this principle
holds true for the moral aspects of behaviour too. However, even adults do not
always realize they are making such choices. There is nothing inherently moral or
immoral about the valuations that are attached to experiences. Even though they are
dialogical in nature, and thus may represent the moral values of a community or at
least of other persons, they can only be considered moral if they become part of an




































































187Moral Education and the Construction of Meaning
in a certain moral code: it involves a personal commitment to a particular way of
life’ (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003, p. 337). Purely keeping to the ‘way of life’, the
mores of a community, discipline without commitment, does not constitute moral
behaviour.
Reflection on the moral quality of actions is triggered especially where conflicts
arise about action decisions. In many situations where decisions have to be taken,
conflicting valuations and rules come into play. Such conflicts are not resolved by
reference to a stable pyramid of values residing in one’s mind, nor as a result of
acquired character traits. Instead, identity narratives are used in a tentative and
heuristic way, either to come to a decision or (if there is no time for that) to
legitimize the decision taken. The question asked is something like, ‘Am I the kind
of person who …’; but it may also take a different form, as in the case mentioned
by Nucci (2001) of somebody who habitually asked what his (deceased) grandfather
would have done in such a situation. As Nucci makes clear, such decisions are often
not of a moral character in the strict sense. Nucci distinguishes three domains of
values that may play a role: morality in the strict sense (which is to do with the
effects of our actions on the well-being of other people, either directly or indirectly),
conventional rules, and personal interests (e.g. pleasure or gain motives). Maybe a
fourth domain should be added to these: the values that are constitutive for certain
practices, such as truth in the case of science. (The boundaries between domains are
fuzzy and depend both on societal circumstances and personal interpretations.)
Conflicts may arise both within and between these domains. In the case of a conflict
between the domain of morality and other domains, the specific situation may well
lead a person to give prevalence to a non-moral value, e.g. choosing for immediate
personal gain instead of the well-being of another person. Morality is never an
automatism. The question is whether the subject is able and willing to take
responsibility for their decisions, and this willingness is the outcome of a process of
moral reflection which can and must be learned.
Although this formulation seems to open the way to all sorts of value relativism,
this is not really the case. Responsibility is a dialogical concept: when one takes
responsibility, this has to be recognized by others. Authority, too, points at an
audience that is willing to listen. As Tappan (1991, p. 13) says, ‘Individuals are […]
responsible, accountable, and answerable for their own actions, not because they are
independent, autonomous agents acting on their own in the world, but rather because
it is only through dialogues and relationships with others that the authority and
responsibility of self can be constituted in the first place’. And these others,
the audience, participate in the same social activities as the individual taking
responsibility. Thus, these principles embody a moral heuristic: those actions are
to be preferred that enhance the dialogue, and make a better social practice possible.
Tappan, referring to Habermas, even maintains that dialogue is inherently
moral. This point of view has been developed by Benhabib (1992) into a commu-
nicative ethics: a moral decision cannot be reached in an abstract dialogue, but only
in a concrete dialogue of concrete persons who are willing and able to observe
the regulative principles inherent in dialogue. However, it is true that such a dialogue
will not ensure that its participants act morally under all circumstances. A value
concept like ‘respect’ only takes on action meaning in a specific practice context;
but in that context, the choice a person makes from a number of action alternatives






































































Problems of moral education
Taking into account the earlier description of how people make decisions that have
moral quality and how such qualities develop, it appears that the types of moral
education most popular at the moment do not take all sides into account. Learning
moral reasoning, the Kohlberg approach, is useful in coming to understand intellec-
tually what scientific concepts like justice mean, and so can help in reflection on the
moral quality of actions and decisions by providing intellectual instruments for
reflection (and this remains true even if one does not accept Kohlberg’s claim for the
universal validity of such values). However, it supposes that decisions are actually
taken in a rational and deliberate way, and does not take the emotional and valuative
background of decisions into account. Coming to a decision is not just a matter of
sound reasoning, and in making decisions we do not refer to value concepts as such,
but to our identity narratives in which our experiences ‘personalize’ these concepts
with affects. There is, then, a real risk that the scientific concepts will not develop
into what Vygotsky called ‘real concepts’, that is, concepts invested with personal
valuations (cf. Wardekker, 1998) and related to personal experiences. In that case,
moral reasoning as learned in school will, for the learners, be just another trick to be
learned for the benefit of good marks, and not have any systematic impact on their
own existence. Moreover, this approach normally disregards the importance of value
domains other than the moral, which does not contribute to its usability in real life
situations.
The second popular approach, character education (e.g. Lickona, 1993), appears to
be the opposite of the moral reasoning approach. The idea is exactly to establish in
the learners a sort of automatic emotional response to morally laden situations.
Students are tackled about conduct that does not conform to norms that are
supposedly uncontested, they are given stories and other examples of morally
acceptable behaviour, and teachers are supposed to act as role models. The aim of
the Character Counts Coalition, for instance, is to produce a ‘person of character’
who ‘is trustworthy, treats all people with respect, acts responsibly, is fair and just,
and is a good citizen’ (Center for the 4th and 5th R’s, 2003). However, this type of
education does hardly take its point of departure in the learner’s own pre-existing
valuations, and thus runs a real risk of becoming oppressively moralizing. The effect
of this may well be that learners resist this pressure, either because it comes from
teachers who represent the type of school tasks that they have learned to dodge as
much as possible, or because they see that in their actual behaviour, not a lot of
people do realize this kind of values unrestrictedly. Also, a ‘person of character’ is
clearly not somebody who has learned to reflect critically on their own behaviour or
that of others, which implies the risk that the values that constitute the ‘character’ are
those chosen by a powerful group, and that learners do not acquire the kind of
reflective abilities directed at their own identity narratives that are necessary in
modern society. All in all, character education does have conservative overtones.
Both approaches also have some problems in common. First of all, they do not
acknowledge the fact that terms referring to values only acquire specific meaning in
a specific situation, and that such a situation may well give rise to conflicting
interests and values. These conflicts are real, and cannot just be solved by correct
reasoning or by relying on the intuitions afforded by ‘character’. Indeed, in many
situations it is not clear at all what the best (in a moral sense) decision would be, and




































































189Moral Education and the Construction of Meaning
necessary to make choices between different and conflicting interests. At the same
time, because it is so often unclear what the ‘best’ moral decision would be, we need
to be able to live and cope with moral uncertainty. Both are aspects of what has been
called social or action competence.
Secondly, both approaches seem to ignore the fact that decisions are seldom made
alone, as the product of an individual rationality. They suppose that the subject, the
acting person, has a discretionary space, that is, the possibility to make decisions and
to act on them. Often however, that possibility is severely restricted because others
engaged in the same practice also act, making decisions or even usurping all of the
discretionary space so that one can only follow another person’s decisions. These
decisions will not always conform to the subject’s sense of what is moral. Also, rules
and prescriptions may, in the perception of the subject, leave little or no space for
decisions. And even where such coercion by existing rules or by others does not
apply, it is often both necessary and possible to confer with others, to negotiate about
the meaning of a situation and the values that should be followed. As a consequence
of their individualistic stance, both approaches all but ignore the moral qualities of
the greater social contexts in which individuals live, and hardly teach learners to
think critically about the morality of societal conditions. They are directed towards
conventionality rather than to the fostering of dialogue or moral resistance.
Thirdly, both approaches divorce moral education from education in ‘knowledge’
subjects. Morality, however, is not a separate subject or a separate field of human
activity. As it rests in the valuations attached to the knowledge of objects, persons,
situations, and practices, and these valuations are formed when learning about these,
any reflection on the moral quality of actions has to be related to the original
knowledge and its personal valuation. Therefore, moral education must not be
something ‘new’ to the learners; it should connect from the beginning to their own
experiences and their own valuations.
Ideas for moral education
From these comments on other approaches, we can begin to construct our own view
of moral education. As I mentioned before, I am not going to construct a full and
consistent model here; I will just mention some points I think are important to start
a process of thinking and discussion. The point of departure for this process is my
position that moral education is concerned with enabling students to critically
consider and revise their own commitments in a discursive process, with the help of,
among other things, the ‘scientific concepts’ of ethics, as a part of their reflective
construction of their identity narratives.
From the third point earlier, it follows that it does not make much sense to confine
moral education in schools to separate lessons or courses. Admittedly, separate
lessons can be of value for learning to use the ‘scientific concepts’ I talked about; but
even so, these lessons need to be related to actual experiences of learners. However,
when such experiences form the starting point and content of separate lessons, this
may cause the field of morality to be perceived as totally separate from other courses
in the school, and indeed provides an excuse not to talk about moral implications in
such other lessons.
However, this does not imply that moral education in schools is impossible
or has to be dependent on chance experiences of individual learners. To a certain





































































however, requires a curriculum that does not aim just at the acquisition of knowledge
and skills but at the introduction of learners in selected cultural and societal
practices. This is what such approaches as dual learning, project method, and the like
are, or ought to be, about. In other words, adequate moral education supposes a
transformation of the curriculum such that learners are enabled to have authentic
experiences and valuate the things they learn in relation to their possible position
in such practices. If the curriculum is organized around the participation in
practices, moral questions related to the complexities, problems and conflicts in such
practices will present themselves along with opportunities to learn knowledge and
skills.
Of course, such a curriculum is not the same thing as learning directly in a
workplace. Educational institutions have a dual obligation here: to ensure that
learners are safe and also feel safe, both physically and emotionally; and to ensure
that there is adequate time and opportunity to reflect and discuss on experiences.
These conditions are necessary for learners to be able to see themselves as part of
a practice on the one hand, and not be totally immersed in it on the other hand. If
an actual practice does not provide such opportunities, they may be simulated in
school. Also, the school should whenever necessary, offer opportunities to concen-
trate on learning necessary knowledge, skills, and attitudes. I am certainly not
advocating to do away with such elements, but to structure the curriculum in such
a way that learners can always relate what they are learning to experiences in
practices. In contrast, the ‘standard’ curriculum often provides learners with knowl-
edge and skills, but expects them to make the relation with practices themselves, and
often much later in their lives. Such a curricular structure is detrimental both to the
possibility for learners to make sense of what they are learning and to their
engagement with practices and the communities related to them, of which moral
engagement is an important element.
Thus, from a sociocultural perspective, the conditions for adequate moral edu-
cation are primarily the same as those for education in general: participation in
cultural practices coupled with systematic reflection, aided by scientific concepts
used as instruments for reflection, but always related to the experiential valuations of
learners. However, we need to be careful about tying education to existing cultural
practices. The aim of general education cannot be to prepare learners for working in
specific practices and learning the rules accepted in those practices. This is especially
the case for economic practices (work), but it is also a more general principle. For
one thing, schools can never prepare learners for every existing practice. Some sort
of generalizing effect has to be invoked, where learning in and by specific practices
leads to the general idea of citizenship. The question to be asked is thus, what do we
learn by participating in specific practices that can also serve as a general principle
in other practices. Actually, the question should probably be a touchstone for the
curriculum: it should introduce learners only in those practices where such wider
principles can be discerned, and reflection should be directed towards those aspects.
Thus, one should ask what practices enable learners to encounter and adopt princi-
ples for living and working together that we think are applicable in other practices,
and ultimately in general citizenship.
Such application, however, is not just a question of generalizing from a number
of concrete experiences to a more general or abstract principle. Rather, students need
to construct the tools that can be used to explore and solve the (moral) problems they




































































191Moral Education and the Construction of Meaning
the moral concepts talked about earlier are but one instance) and to provide the
opportunity to use them and ‘appropriate’ them in a variety of situations.
Many existing curricula, however, do not provide such opportunities, as ‘prep-
aration for participation in society’ often implies presenting a simplified and edited
picture of a practice in which the inherent complexities and conflicts have disap-
peared. This denies learners the opportunities to encounter real moral problems (for
instance, which faction to support and for what reasons) and to take a critical stance
toward the proceedings in and the future development of a practice. Adequate
education should help learners to discern such complexities, to find words, stories
and images to talk about them, and to handle them adequately in their actions with
the help of all kinds of ‘instruments’ provided. (Conroy (2003), for instance, makes
a case for using poetry to give learners a feeling for such complexity. Here again, it
appears that getting a feeling for such things may be at least as important as being
able to reason objectively about them.)
All in all, moral education turns out to be just a specific form of helping learners
to make personal sense of the world they are living in and act accordingly. In other
words, it is an aspect of the task of education in helping learners develop a personal
identity. In that sense, it is not separate from general education, but an indispensable
aspect of it. It is time, I think, to develop these ideas into a sociocultural research
programme.
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